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Abstract

(i.e., collaborative cheating) is deserving of greater
scrutiny than what has been done previously [e.g., 3].
This is partly because little research examines how
unethical decision making occurs at the collective level
[10]. One likely reason why little research exists on
collaborative cheating is that studying it presents many
problems that are not easily broached conventionally
(e.g., experimental research), not the least of which
involves gaining access to data on ethically and legally
sensitive matters [11].
Given that organizations are increasingly relying
on group decision making to compete in the
marketplace, understanding what drives individuals to
contribute to a collective cheating effort is critical.
Recently, the Volkswagen emissions scandal, which
involved many managers and engineers who helped
create, implement, and conceal a device that would
cheat emissions testing, provided scholars with the
opportunity to understand how collaborative cheating
emerges. Here, we use case study methodology to
explain how collaborative cheating emerged at VW in
order to form propositions regarding how this
phenomenon emerges in organizational settings in
general, providing direction for future study. To
diagnose the causes of collaborative cheating at VW,
we apply the open-systems model [12], a commonly
used diagnostic framework in organizational research.
This model acknowledges that organization’s act on
information in their larger environment, transforming
inputs (e.g., human capital, materials) into outputs
(e.g., goods, services, ideas) via transformation
processes (e.g., social components, and technological
components). How well these outputs satisfy
constraints in the environment (e.g., regulatory needs
and customer demands) serves as feedback for the
organizational system, which can result in changes to
the system or how it should be regulated. By applying
this diagnostic model to our data, we hope to illuminate
the numerous influences both inside and outside VW
that contributed to the emergence of collaborative
cheating.
We use case study methods for the following
reasons. First, compared to quantitative approaches,

Since 2014, Volkswagen (VW) has been enthralled
in a reputation-tarnishing cheating scandal that has
raised questions regarding how collaborative cheating
unfolds in organizational settings. While the
behavioral ethics literature provides some insights, this
literature is largely confined to individual decision
makers and so little work examining how collaborative
cheating emerges has been done. Therefore, with this
case study, we draw on various data sources (e.g.,
court case summaries, investigative reporting,
technical reports, popular press outlets, and publically
available employee interviews) and use case study
methodology (i.e., grounded theory, open-systems
diagnostics) to construct a process model that explains
how collaborative cheating emerges in organizational
settings. Theoretical and practical implications are
also discussed.

1. Introduction
Many researchers extol the virtues of collaboration
in organizational settings [1,2]. Collaboration has been
defined as a process by which individuals with various
backgrounds come together and, through interaction,
information sharing, and coordination of activities
learn and, ultimately, perform [2]. Collaboration is
often viewed as a vehicle that facilitates ongoing
learning, results in innovative strategies for competing
in the marketplace, promotes diversity, and other
positive outcomes for organizations.
However, there are times in organizational life
when individuals within a team setting decide to cheat,
and coordinate their activities as needed (e.g., students
sharing tests to help their peers, scientists using
questionable research practices to ensure a study gets
published). Though we understand what drives
individuals to cheat, such as the facilitating conditions
(e.g., social norms) and individual differences (e.g.,
moral disengagement) [4-9], what compels individuals
to contribute to and sustain a collective cheating effort
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qualitative methods flexibly capture the richness of
collective constructs and processes in ways that can
lead to generalizable and testable theory [13,14].
Second, the Volkswagen scandal has birthed a large
volume of information on the inner-workings of VW
leading up to the creation, implementation, and
concealment of the defeat device, making these
methods well-suited to the available data. Third, a case
study allows us to form a complex yet detailed
understanding of the role of context (e.g., regulations,
culture, leadership) and causal mechanisms that shape
the emergence of collaborative cheating behavior [15].
Researchers have suggested that we might learn
something by studying specific cases of organizational
failures [16]. Here, we seek to do just that by
answering the following research question:
What are the mechanisms that explain how
collaborative cheating, a form of collective and
coordinated unethical behavior, emerges in
organizations?

VW AG, CEO of VW Group of America, and CEO of
the VW Passenger Cars brand) acted with scienter,
which refers to a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.

1.2. Study Purpose
We use qualitative research methods to examine
key historical events in the VW scandal, namely the (1)
creation, (2) implementation and refinement, and (3)
concealment of the defeat device. We use this timeline
to construct a process model describing how
collaborative cheating emerges. Our data come from
multiple sources (e.g., legal documents, investigative
reporting, technical reports, popular press outlets, and
employee interviews). The high-profile nature of the
VW scandal has led (and continues to lead) to the
creation of many documents, making it a prime
candidate for analysis via case study [15,19].

2. Case Study Methods

1.1. An Overview of the Volkswagen Emissions
Scandal

Following guidance from the literature [14,20], we
began our case study with a focal concept –
collaborative cheating – to direct our analysis. We
examine all relevant factors within the context of the
VW scandal (i.e., management, culture, industry
setting, organizational strategy, individual histories) in
order to understand how individuals within VW
conspired to cheat emissions testing. We define
collaborative cheating as cheating that occurs when
individuals of various backgrounds interact to create,
implement, and sustain solutions to problems that
violate ethical obligations or norms. This definition
shares features of a commonly used definition of
collaboration that we introduced earlier, such as the
presence of a variety of expertise that is brought
together via information sharing, shared creative
problem solving, and coordination within the group
[2]. However, collaborative cheating would involve
factors that incline individuals to disregard ethical
principles, or to morally disengage from their behavior
[6,21], in the pursuit of short-term self-interest.
Collaborative cheating is emergent and involves
sharing knowledge and expertise. However, agents
contributing to a collective cheating effort recognize
ethical wrongdoings and demonstrate a willingness to
disregard such obligations and rationalize their
behavior (e.g., for the greater good of their company,
their own self-interest, or both). It also differs from
individual cheating, which involves no voluntary
assistance from others (e.g., cheating on a test by

Since 2014, VW has been embroiled in a cheating
scandal that has tarnished its reputation. In 2014,
researchers studying VW diesel-burning vehicles
identified a large discrepancy between the emissions
levels produced under laboratory and typical driving
conditions [17]. This discrepancy was later attributed
to a defeat device (software) created under the
direction of VW management. This defeat device
enabled equipped vehicles to respond to laboratory
testing procedures by constraining emissions to levels
deemed acceptable by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). When performing under typical driving
conditions, equipped vehicles produced between five
and thirty-five times the level of toxins deemed
acceptable by the EPA [17]. Such excess pollution was
predicted to cause approximately 59 premature deaths,
31 cases of chronic bronchitis, 34 hospital admissions,
120,000 days of restricted activity—including lost
work days—210,000 days with lower-respiratory
problems and 33,000 days with increased use of
asthma inhalers. The overall cost burden would be
approximately $450 million [18].
In 2017, a court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence indicating that certain VW
managers1 in power during the scandal (i.e., CEO of
1

 For anonymity, all names throughout the paper are replaced with
generic identifiers (e.g., Executive A, Engineer A, etc.)
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keeping correct answers written on a notecard that is
taped to the bill of a baseball cap).

the supporting evidence was appropriate for a given
event. For instance, one of our sources linked VW’s
behavior to policy issued by the EPA, but did not cite
the EPA directly. So we identified the EPA document
that issued this policy. Over time, we refined the data
and our timeline to more closely align the two and,
following Stake [20], clarified event descriptions to
draw readers’ attention to structural and procedural
factors relating to the emergence of collaborative
cheating at VW. In drawing inferences, we drew on the
highest quality data in our dataset, which often meant
drawing directly from legal documents. Articles from
the popular press often corroborated the narrative we
constructed, leant us possible interpretations of the
facts, or served as a resource that helped us identify
more credible facts (e.g., locating additional cases/legal
proceedings, interviews, etc.). Once these events were
constructed, they were clustered into themes, which
informed the construction of
a causal model
explaining how collaborative cheating emerges (see
Figure 1). Lastly, drawing on the open-systems
approach [12], we built a causal model articulating the
mechanisms that might explain how collaborative
cheating emerged at VW and, correspondingly, how
such phenomena might emerge in general.

2.1. Data Collection
Data were collected in early 2017. We gathered
literature on the VW emissions scandal using Google’s
search engine to access primary and secondary sources.
We took steps to ensure a thorough search by training
four research assistants to look through 10 pages of
Google search returns, per search term, as well as any
relevant sources cited therein. A source was considered
relevant and included in our dataset if it contained
narrative descriptions on the inner-workings of VW
related to (1) the creation and refinement of the defeat
device, (2) the implementation of the defeat device,
and (3) the lengthy concealment of the defeat device.
Sources included legal documents, investigative
journalist reports, technical reports, employee
interviews, and popular press articles.

2.2. Timeline Construction
In order to focus on the most salient actions of VW
as they related to the creation, implementation, and
cover up of the defeat device, we constructed a
timeline of relevant events and links to sources. We
identified key actors (e.g., VW managers and
engineers) along with actions that pertained to the
creation, implementation, and concealment of the
defeat device. To ensure that the timeline was credible,
research assistants were tasked with being devil’s
advocates and challenging both the emerging narrative
and the credibility of sources of the narrative.
Additionally, the authors critiqued the timeline and
gathered more information as needed or directed the
research assistants to do so.

3. How Collaborative Cheating Unfolded at
VW
In crafting our timeline, it quickly became apparent
that the behavior occurring at VW was not an isolated,
one-time event. Rather, it was an ongoing effort
reflecting many decision points faced by multiple VW
employees from various departments and hierarchical
levels who were making unique contributions over a
substantial period of time. Consistent with our original
intentions, we viewed the scandal as unfolding in three
stages: (1) the creation of the defeat device
[1999–2006], (2) the implementation and refinement of
the defeat device [2007–2013], and (3) the
concealment (and revelation) of the defeat device’s
existence [2014–present]. Table 1 lists those events
most relevant to our analysis and links these events to
emergent themes (our complete timeline, along with
supporting data, is available for interested readers as
supplemental
online
material.
See
https://osf.io/w8zyx/). We now summarize key events
from these three periods.

2.3. Data Analysis and Model Construction
In order to build a causal model that explains how
collaborative cheating emerges, we used grounded
theory [22], which “begins with observations or data
and seeks to induce empirical generalizations and
concepts that reflect the contours or features of data”
[13]. Further, drawing on Stake’s guidance for
case-study research [20], we bounded the case by
focusing on generating concepts that explain how
collaborative cheating emerged at VW. We used our
timeline as a guide for immersing ourselves in the data.
While seeking to draw inferences, we also ensured that

3.1. Creation of the Defeat Device
In the 1990s, with the amendment of the Clean Air
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Act, the U.S. began a process of tightening emissions
regulations, with the phase-in of new standards
scheduled for 2004. Independently, in 1999, Audi
engineers created software that could defeat European
emissions testing. In 2006, following threats from VW
AG’s CEO (Executive A) – who had a reputation for
firing engineers who did not meet his exacting
standards – that employees would lose their jobs if VW
could not sell diesel engines in the U.S, two
department heads (Manager E, Head of VW’s Engine
Development After-Treatment Department and
Manager D, Head of Diesel Engine Development for
VW), knowing both that their engines exceeded
emissions standards and how U.S. regulators would
test VW vehicles, led the team that would create the
defeat device. During this time, a VW employee
acquired software from Company A (an automotive
engineering company specializing in software,
electronics, and technology which VW owned 50% of)
to create the EA189 engine that would be capable of
defeating emissions testing.
Several themes emerge from this stage in the
scandal. The creation of the defeat device software by
Audi, a subsidiary of VW, suggests that the VW
leadership developed a pervasive culture that
encouraged the use of unethical means to attain market
superiority. While the unethical leadership literature
draws attention to how such leaders encourage
subordinates to use any means to achieve market
superiority [23], little field data exists examining how
unethical leadership encourages individuals to
collaboratively cheat, a point to which we now turn.
Moving closer to the creation of the defeat device,
our data suggest that authority or bullying from
leadership along with normative pressures can drive
individuals within a group to decide to contribute to a
collaborative cheating effort. While the influence of
authority and conformity on individual decisions are
fairly
well-documented
social
psychological
phenomena (e.g., administer lethal shocks, deliver
incorrect answers in a group setting to avoid standing
out, go along with a bad idea) [24-26], their role in
causing collaborative cheating is not. Our data suggest
that authority and normative pressures drove
employees to collaborate out of short-term self-interest,
generating solutions that were desirable from the
perspective of their superiors’. Such findings are
mirrored in the available literature [27]. However, this
literature has not suggested a link between such
organizational structures and collaborative cheating.
The data we have covered suggest that unethical
leaders can promote collaborative cheating by creating
a climate of fear that facilitates employees’ collective

moral disengagement from ethical obligations [28]. In
other words, leaders motivate employees to cheat, not
for VW, but to spare themselves (at least, in the
short-term). Scholars examining causes of unethical
pro-organizational behavior [4,5,6] might be best
positioned to study this phenomena (see 5 for an
exemplar). Additionally, while a wealth of literature
exists on unethical or destructive leadership [23,29],
we identified only one study linking such leadership to
creative problem solving and it demonstrated that
abusive leadership, which is apparent in our data,
cascades down organizational hierarchies (consistent
with our perspective), and ultimately undermines
organizational creativity [30]. Our data suggest that
such leaders might also cultivate a collective
bottom-line mentality among employees, resulting in
collaborative ventures that produce unethical solutions.

3.2. Implementation and Refinement of the
Defeat Device
In 2007, after Manager E and Manager D
authorized the use of the defeat device, Manager E and
VW employees presented their newly developed engine
to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
California Air Resources Board (CARB) in order to
obtain approval for marketing diesel vehicles to the
U.S. In this meeting, Manager E and VW employees
knowingly omitted and concealed information
regarding the defeat device’s existence. Around the
same time, Company A warns VW executive leadership
about the illegalities of using defeat devices, though
later works with VW to implement the software. Later
in 2007, Manager E, Manager D, and VW employees
meet to discuss which team is ultimately responsible
for ensuring that the EA189 engine satisfies emissions
standards. The meeting ends with Manager E arguing
to continue developing the EA189 engine with the
defeat device and Manager D formally authorizing the
deployment of the EA189 engine. After presenting the
EA189 engine to VW executives in a presentation that
supposedly omits mention of the defeat device,
Managers E and D agree to remain silent about the
defeat device. Engineer B, who worked on the team
that developed the defeat device, later moves to the
U.S. to oversee testing of the new diesel vehicles. In
2011, a supervisor (Supervisor A, VW AG’s Quality
Management and Product Safety supervisor) identifies
the defeat device and raises concerns to Manager B (a
department
head)
regarding
the
illegality/risk/consequences of using the device.
Supervisor A later becomes complicit in the
4
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concealment of the device. After receiving a letter from
VW engineers suggesting that the defeat device
stresses the exhaust system resulting in hardware
failures, Supervisor A and Manager B, the head of
engine development for the VW Passenger Cars brand,
instruct the engineers to destroy said letter. Supervisor
A, Manager B, and VW engineers then activated a
“steering wheel angle recognition” feature to address
the hardware failure, which allowed the vehicle to
detect when it was undergoing testing or being driven
on the road (when it no longer needed to operate in a
low-emissions mode) and virtually ensured that it
would go undetected using conventional laboratory
methods (i.e., via dynamometer). VW engineers
expressed concerns to management, particularly
Manager B, about this software update. Nevertheless,
Manager B authorized the installation of the function
and instructed VW employees to submit applications for
the EPA to certify their vehicles.
The evidence emerging from this stage helps
explain how the number of employees contributing to a
collaborative cheating effort increased over time –
what we call an enveloping effect. The defeat device
stressed equipped vehicles, indirectly revealing its
existence to naive audience members. It is worth
pointing out that the team that designed the defeat
device at VW was aware that hardware failures would
occur. Perhaps the team hoped to find a better solution
in time (which we admit is mere speculation at this
point in time). Nevertheless, when hardware failures
occurred, those responsible for the defeat device had to
address this issue. At this point in the timeline, many
individuals had already contributed to the effort (or
were still doing so), so for individuals uncovering the
existence of the defeat device, a cost-benefit judgment
had to be made in regard to contributing to the device’s
implementation. The costs of failing to contribute (e.g.,
losing one’s job, threatening one’s peers’ or superiors’
livelihoods) were probably seen as excessively high.
Subsequently, future detections brought with them an
increasingly larger number of contributors, further
increasing pressures to contribute to the defeat device’s
ongoing use by raising costs of nonconformance. This
strengthened the climate of fear and norms for
conformity, virtually ensuring that the effort would
envelop more people. Such an enveloping effect would
be well-explained by threshold models of collective
behavior [31], which note that individuals will join
collective efforts when perceived benefits outweigh
perceived costs of not doing so (e.g., loss of one’s job,
displeasing one’s supervisors). Such models also
explain the influence of authority, power, and
conformity that were discussed previously and the

clear escalation of unethical commitments that we see
at this point in the case [32,33]. They may also explain
how cooperation can promote corruption when
partners’ self-interests are aligned – more people
simply get involved, raising the perceived costs of
nonconformance [34].

3.3. Ongoing Concealment (and Revelation) of
the Defeat Device
The last stage of our narrative begins in 2014, when
a study sponsored by the International Council on
Clean Transportation (ICCT) revealed that VW
diesel-burning vehicles emitted NOx at levels between
5 and 35 times the allowed limit. VW headquarters in
Wolfsburg elected to continue refining the device
while also appearing to cooperate with U.S. regulators
(i.e., the EPA and CARB). VW issued a recall of
500,000 vehicles and promised to address the
emissions anomaly. However, part of the recall
consisted of a software update to refine the defeat
device’s ability to evade detection.
Going into 2015, executive leadership engaged in
the following activities that enveloped more employees
in the overall collaborative cheating effort: (1) They
restricted communications within VW to prevent
employees from revealing any awareness of a defeat
device, (2) they provided false explanations to
regulators for emissions non-compliance (e.g.,
“irregularities” and “abnormalities,” (3) they formed
ad-hoc task forces to fabricate false reasons for the
emissions anomaly, and (4) they continued to apply for
approvals from the EPA to sell their emissions
non-compliant vehicles in the U.S. Eventually, an
unnamed employee (a VW executive in the U.S.
responsible for emissions compliance) neglected
executive instruction to keep the device concealed and
explained the device’s existence to CARB, forcing VW
executives to formally reveal the software and bringing
the device’s concealment to an abrupt end.
This final stage in the scandal reveals a clear
escalation of unethical organizational commitments
involving leadership that envelops all relevant VW
employees, and once revealed, damages VW’s
reputation. This outcome would be foreseen by
Cialdini [35], who proposed that each act of
organizational dishonesty raises the probability that
dishonesty will be found out, causing reputational
damages. He also argued that organizational deceptions
can affect employee turnover by encouraging
employees who are uncomfortable with engaging in
unethical behavior to leave while those who are
5
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comfortable with dishonesty remain, further increasing
the probability of dishonest acts. Additionally, Cialdini
argued that organizational leaders’ paranoia will
increase, leading them to monitor employee behavior
and create a climate of mistrust that harms firm
performance. After considering our data from all three
stages, it is clear that leaders’ monitoring behavior
increased, particularly once there was evidence
indicating the existence of a defeat device. Though
supporting one of Cialdini’s claims, our data go one
step further and suggest what we are tentatively calling
a corrupting effect – VW leadership appeared to have
turned a large number of employees who were initially
uncomfortable contributing to the defeat device’s
ongoing use into contributors to the collaborative
cheating effort. We suspect that all of the social factors
we have discussed thus far (e.g., abuse, conformity,
number of individuals contributing to the collaborative
cheating effort) helped employees to perceive high
costs of not contributing to the collective cheating
effort, making it easier to morally disengage from their
ethical responsibilities. If this corrupting effect is real,
then much research is needed to understand its
boundary conditions and to prevent these effects from
emerging in organizational life.

expertise within the collective effort increases, raising
the group’s ability to refine and sustain further
collaborative cheating and (2) more people become at
risk of reaching their threshold for joining the
collective effort. Those who contribute become
invested in sustaining the collaborative cheating effort.
Hence, rather than leaving because they have been
encouraged to violate their values, they remain. With a
greater number of individuals contributing to the
collective cheating effort(s), the organization’s use of
deceptive tactics increase (e.g., fraudulent products or
services), raising the risk that falsehoods will be found
out, resulting in organizational decline.

4. Discussion
Our case study suggests that collaborative cheating
is more likely to occur when organizational cultures
and the leaders that establish them create a social
context (e.g., climate of fear, collective bottom line
mentality) that motivates employees to use any means
necessary to achieve market superiority. We find that
such leadership functions much like a tumor [35],
causing organizational behavior that leads employees
who seemingly have a moral compass (e.g., expressing
displeasure with contributing to a collective cheating
effort) to collaboratively cheat. Our study contributes
to research on collective forms of corrupt behavior by
showing how institutional structures (e.g., leadership)
and social factors (e.g., culture, climate, norms) might
foster collaborative cheating, addressing a call for
research into collective forms of unethical behavior
[10].

4. How Collaborative Cheating Emerges in
Organizations
Our overall causal model (see Figure 1), which is
both grounded in our data and informed by the
literature, suggests that collaborative cheating emerges
as a consequence of organizational leadership that, in
response to constraints on organizational performance,
issues credible threats to subordinates. An ethically
permissive organizational culture (which is not
independent from leadership) and the number of
collaborators, which increase over time, play similar
causal roles: they cultivate a climate of fear where
employees’ job security is threatened [36] and a
collective bottom line mentality where employees’
self-interests become aligned [34], motivating them to
pursue strategies that would secure their short-term
self-interests. If a culture is ethically permissive, then
unethical solutions may already exist, helping the
collaborative cheating effort to emerge. As the
collaborative cheating effort unfolds over time, more
actors become aware and, upon appraising the
costliness of failing to contribute, join the collective
cheating effort. They then morally disengage (i.e.,
rationalize) contributing to the effort. As the number of
individual contributors increases, (1) the variety of

4.1. Theoretical and Practical Implications
The behavioral ethics literature has been long
informed by an ethical calculus perspective [9], which
suggests that cost-benefit estimates inform the decision
to cheat [7-9,11]. In this framework, individuals are
likely to cheat if the perceived benefits of doing so
outweigh the perceived costs. Another framework,
grounded in social norms, suggests that the social
context informs such decision making [8,37-40]. By
explaining collaborative cheating behavior as an
outcome of a cost benefit analysis that is informed by
normative considerations [31], our study highlights a
deep relationship between these two perspectives.
Practically speaking, our findings suggest that
remedies for collaborative cheating will be difficult to
craft. Once organizational leaders commit to an
unethical action, escalation of further commitments
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will likely follow, generating collective moral
disengagement, and enveloping others, leading to ever
riskier behavior (e.g., targeting regulations and
regulators themselves). Organizational members may
even grow persistently resistant to accusations of
unethical behavior. Indeed, at least one VW executive
denied in an interview that the VW scandal concerned
a breach of ethics. While an obvious solution seems to
be a change of leadership (e.g., top management team)
and governance (e.g., board of directors), bringing this
about is not so straightforward.

[3] M.J. Pearsall and A.P.J. Ellis, “Thick as thieves: The
effects of ethical orientation and psychological safety on
unethical team behavior,” Journal of Applied Psychology,
vol. 96, pp. 401–411, 2011.
[4] E.E. Umphress, J.B. Bingham, and M.S. Mitchell,
“Unethical behavior in the name of the company: The
moderating effect of organizational identification and
positive reciprocity beliefs on unethical pro-organizational
behavior,” Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 95, pp.
769–780, 2010.
[5] C.M. Castille, J.E. Buckner, and C.Thoroughgood,
“Prosocial citizens without a moral compass? Examining the
relationship between Machiavellianism and unethical
pro-organizational behavior,” Journal of Business Ethics,
2016.

4.2. Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for
Future Research
Though we aimed to systematically collect and
analyze data to allow replicability, our study has many
limitations that directly impinge upon our data quality
and methodology. To address quality issues, we relied
primarily on legal documents to craft our narrative.
However, given the nature of our case (i.e.,
organizational deception) there is no guarantee that
VW
employees providing data on VW’s
inner-workings did not commit perjury. As there are
ongoing investigations, more facts will emerge, which
may call into question our findings and causal model.
Therefore, our model should be viewed as preliminary
and will be updated as more facts emerge. In regard to
the generalizability of our process model, as our study
consisted of a single case inside a German automaker,
cultural-, industry-, and company-specific factors (to
name a few) likely constrain the generalizability of our
model. It is likely the case that our model contains
particularisms that constrain generalizability. However,
given that other organizations within the automotive
industry are facing emissions cheating scandals (e.g.,
Fiat-Chrysler, General Motors), future research
extending our methodology to these organizations
would test the credibility of our model.

[6] M. Chen, C.C. Chen, and O.J. Sheldon, “Relaxing moral
reasoning to win: How organizational identification relates to
unethical pro-organizational behavior,” Journal of Applied
Psychology, 2016.
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pp. 323–338,  1972.
[8] J. Hill and R.A. Kochendorfer, “Knowledge of peer
success and risk of detection as determinants of cheating,”
Developmental Psychology, vol. 1, pp. 231–238, 1969.
[9] J.J. Kish-Gephart, D.A. Harrison, and L.K. Treviño, “Bad
apples, bad cases, and bad barrels: Meta-analytic evidence
about sources of unethical decisions at work,” Journal of
Applied Psychology, vol. 95, pp. 1–31, 2010.
[10] L.K. Treviño, G.R. Weaver, and S.J. Reynolds,
“Behavioral ethics in organizations: A review,” Journal of
Management, vol. 32, pp. 951–990, 2006.
[11] L.K. Treviño and G.R. Weaver, “Punishment in
organizations; descriptive and normative perspectives”, in M.
Schminke (Ed.) Managerial ethics: Moral management of
people and processes, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp.
99–114. 1998.
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Table 1. Table Containing Event Data and Emergent Themes
(#Event Number) Summary of Event Data

Emergent Themes

(#4) EPA plans tighter emissions standards and sets a timeline for implementation.
(#15) Diesel engines cannot both satisfy customer demands for power and comply with emissions
standards.
(#48) EPA and CARB refuse to approve VW vehicles until VW comes forward with explanations for
emissions issues.

Constraints on
Performance/Behavior

(#9) Audi engineers develop a prototypical device for defeating emissions testing, but it is not yet
implemented.
(#2) VW was fined for employing defeat devices (in 1973).
(#6 & #8) General Motors sues VW AG, Executive A, GM Executive A, and other GM employees
over corporate espionage scandal. VW forced to pay $100 million dollars to GM and to buy $1
billion in components from one of GM’s companies.
(#12) “Perks and prostitutes” scandal comes to light. VW paid for “special bonuses”— including
expenses for prostitutes—to the chairman of the VW workers council. Executive K, Chairman A,
and Deputy A all received prison sentences in the wake of the scandal.

Ethically Permissive
Organizational Culture

(#18) Executive A (CEO of VW AG), who was infamous for firing subordinates if they did not meet
his exact standards, threatens engineers promising to fire them if they cannot sell diesel engines in
the U.S.

Abusive Supervision

(#17) Two heads of separate departments (Manager E & Manager D), knowing how the vehicles
will be tested and recognizing that vehicles cannot satisfy power, timing, and emissions constraints,
direct employees to design, create, and implement an engine capable of cheating the emissions test.
Engineer B leads the team, which obtains software from Company A that is turned into the defeat
device. After being informed of the defeat device’s use, they (Manager E & Manager D) authorize
its use.
(#26) Engineer B moves to U.S. to oversee development of vehicles fitted with defeat devices.
(#31) Supervisor A and Manager B instruct VW engineers to destroy document explaining how
defeat device causes hardware failures.
(#34) Manager B authorizes improvements to the defeat device software.
(#39) Manager C calls a VW employee “crazy” for sending out an email implying knowledge of the
defeat device, its concealment, and implicating Manager C and Manager B.
(#51) Manager C misleads CARB by suggesting that increased emissions were due to
“irregularities” and “abnormalities” rather than a defeat device.
(#46 & 47) Liaison A encourages VW employees to think of false reasons why VW vehicles emit
excessive emissions. Reiterates in a later email that they need “good arguments” to counter
questions from U.S. regulators.
(#50) Executive F provides false information pertaining to VW AG’s total liabilities, profit, assets,
and shareholder’s equity.
(#52) Manager B and other co-conspirators give a script to employees meeting with CARB. This
script specifies further concealment of the defeat device and instructs employees to obtain approval
from CARB to  sell newer vehicles that contain defeat devices.
(#59) Executive C denies that the scandal is an ethical problem.

Unethical Leadership via
Formal (e.g.,
management
communications,
approvals) and Informal
(e.g., authority)
Structures

(#17) Company A shares prototypical defeat device software with the team responsible for creating
what became known as VW’s defeat device.
(#19) Manager E and employees present EA 189 engine to EPA and CARB without disclosing
defeat device’s existence.
(#22 & 23) Manager D and Manager E present EA 189 engine to executives, omitting information
about the defeat device.
(#24) Manager D tells Manager E they will never present the information on the defeat device to
anyone.
(#37) Manager C notifies Supervisor A that ICCT members suspect cheating.
(#38) Manager B, Supervisor A, Manager C, Liaison A, and co-conspirators, responding to
questions from CARB in coordination with the EPA, elect to not disclose the defeat device while
appearing to cooperate with U.S. regulators.
(#44) VW headquarters in Wolfsburg uses a recall to refine the defeat device.

Selective Information
Sharing and also
Complicit Deception by
Means of Omission and
Fabrication
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(#51) Manager C deceives CARB citing technical reasons such as “irregularities” and
“abnormalities”.
(#52) Manager B and other co-conspirators provide a script to employees who meet with CARB.
The script encourages further concealment of the defeat device, which will allow VW to obtain
approval to sell newer vehicles that still contain the defeat device.
(#20) Company A warns VW executives (including Executive B) that the defeat device is illegal.
Later, works with VW employees to create defeat device.
(#28) Supervisor A explains illegality of defeat device to Manager B along with risks and
consequences of using device.
(#31) VW engineers give document to Supervisor A and Manager B explaining how the defeat
device stresses the exhaust system, resulting in hardware failures.
(#33) VW engineers express ethical concern to management about refined defeat device, but sought
approval from senior management (Manager B).
(#53) VW employee neglects instructions from management, revealing both the existence of the
defeat device and the conspiracy to cheat the emissions test to CARB.
(#21) Manager E and Manager D disagree over the team responsible for ensuring emissions
standards.
(#21) Manager E argues that production of the EA189 engine should continue. Manager D
authorizes Manager E to implement defeat device.
(#31) Supervisor A and Manager B instruct VW engineers to destroy document explaining how
defeat device causes hardware failures.
(#32) VW engineers, responding to Supervisor A and Manager B’s instructions to destroy document
explaining how the defeat device causes hardware failures, modify the defeat device by activating a
steering wheel angle recognition feature.
(#34) Manager B authorizes improvements to defeat device software.
(#51) Manager C misleads CARB by suggesting that increased emissions were due to
“irregularities” and “abnormalities” rather than a defeat device.
(#46 & 47) Liaison A encourages VW employees to think of false reasons why VW vehicles emit
excessive emissions. Reiterates in a later email that they need “good arguments” to counter
questions from U.S. regulators.
(#50) Executive F provides false information pertaining to VW AG’s total liabilities, profit, assets,
and shareholders’ equity.
(#52) Manager B and other co-conspirators provide employees meeting with CARB with a script
that encourages further concealment of the defeat device and might attain approval to sell newer
vehicles that still contain defeat devices.

Expressions of Ethical
Concerns (and
Subsequent Relapse) –
Moral Disengagement

Conflict/Confusion Over
and Diffusion of Ethical
Responsibility

Collaborative Cheating
& Escalation of
Unethical Commitments

Note: # – refers to the event number found in the supplemental timeline (https://osf.io/w8zyx/), which is placed here for the
reader to reference if needed. Additionally, data sources are included for each event in the timeline.
Figure 1. How Collaborative Cheating Emerges in Organizations
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